Thursday, December 31, 2009

Vayechi—Making The Call II

In continuing and expanding on last week’s theme of leadership, as last week’s parsha illustrated how two paradigmatic Jewish leaders dealt with emergency situations, this week the brachos that Yaakov gives actually start with Yaakov castigating his three oldest sons for what he saw as consequences of leadership failures.

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks writes an extensive treatment on this theme regarding Reuven and his lost “potential”, not only as his father saw it, but more poignantly, from another incident, in Vayeshev, where Reuven saves Yosef from the rest of the brothers. At least, initially; 37:21-22 indicates that while he did throw him in the pit to forestall what seemed like imminent bloodshed [and got the requisite spiritual credit], posuk 22 also indicates where Reuven failed to “seal the deal”: he planned to “return him [Yosef] to his father], but as we see later in 29-30, while he’s otherwise occupied, Yehuda and the other brothers sell Yosef off, and Reuven’s first reaction is “va-ani ana ani va” [loosely translated: “now where do I go?”], which leads him to help in the ensuing cover-up. How much Yaakov knew about Reuven’s involvement is arguable; Rabbi Shlomo Riskin discussed Yaakov’s possible musings about his—and his sons’-- responsibility for Yosef’s disappearance, so it might follow that Yaakov referred only to Reuven’s initial misstep of removing his father’s couch from Bilhah’s tent as his evidence of Reuven’s lost potential, and a harbinger of his later failures. [As I mentioned last week, Reuven tries—in a very awkward manner—to guarantee Binyamin’s safety when the brothers are trying to convince Yaakov to send him to Egypt [see 42:37, 38]; Reuven’s idea—“my two sons will die”—causes Yaakov to think [pace Rashi on 38] “My firstborn is a fool [“shoteh”]. At this point there is no question in Yaakov’s mind that Reuven has no leadership ability, and it’s no accident—as we shall soon see--that it is Yehuda who steps into the vacuum with his guarantee, as we saw last week.]

So now we have an example of expected leadership lost: Reuven, the first-born, was not going to achieve the greatness for which he had been ostensibly destined for, even if only because of a perceived birthright. So, the mantle falls to Shimon and Levi.

Or does it? On the face of it, Yaakov is still sore at them for the massacre in Shechem; the posuk reads “be-apam hargu ish”—that they acted out of anger, and “birtzonam akru shor”—they took spoils willingly and with malice aforethought [contrast that with the later military operations in Esther: “uv-biza lo shalchu et yadam”—no profiting from bloodshed. Not for nothing did Yaakov complain in Vayishlach 34:30 that they had caused him a major PR problem: “achartem osi le’havisheni be-yoshvei ha-aretz”.] Yet Yaakov recognized that in their zeal to act—and, at least in the case of Shechem, there was ample justification—there was a contrast to Reuven’s tendencies to be both impetuous and hesitant. Therefore, as Rashi on 49:7 indicates, Yaakov’s apparent meted consequence of splitting them up and spreading them out [“achalkem”/”va-aphitzem”] was actually a device to channel their zeal into more productive leadership positions: Shimon became soldiers and teachers, while Levi became…Levites. The catch was: they never could be “top dogs”—Shimon was “condemned” to pedagogy and military, and Levi had to stay firmly on the religion side of religion and state, with terrible consequences when the Hasmoneans crossed that line.

From there we come to Yehuda. As we saw last week, he claimed his mantle by steeping into the breach at the eleventh hour with his guarantee to Yaakov for Binyomin’s, and then his following through on that guarantee at great personal cost. Ironically, Yehuda’s first “call” as a leader is rather dubious: he suggests that the brothers sell Yosef into slavery and profit, rather than kill him [37:26-27]. Yet even in this there is an element that hints at his effectiveness: the brothers listen to him and carry out his proposal, in contrast to Reuven’s “holding” action of throwing Yosef in the pit. As has been discussed at length in Rashi and midrashim, however, what ultimately gets Yehuda to his position is his experiences following the sale, particularly losing his two oldest sons and the Tamar incident, where he publicly confesses that he was in the wrong. Yehuda, unlike Reuven, has learned from his mistakes—and uses his undeniable leadership talent to correct those mistakes, as is finally revealed when he steps up for Binyamin. Additionally, as will be echoed when similar things happen to his Davidic descendants [David included], Yehuda also experienced the loss of his position, not to mention being force to take responsibility for the actions of his constituents, as evidenced by 38:1, “Va-yered Yehuda me-es echav”: as Rashi points out, the brothers blamed him for Yaakov’s pain: “if you would have told us to return Yosef to Yaakov we would have listened to you.”

The ultimate lesson here is not only regarding decisions made by leaders, however. It may be extended to anyone forced to make a “judgment call”, which may just be everyone, all the time. In a certain sense, the current global zeitgeist [a disingenuous one, to be sure, but still truistic, to a point] is, as the Crunch ads say, “No Judgments”. Ceratinly one should remember Hillel in Avos 2:4 not to judge anyone until you’ve been in the “same place”, or as Bartenura explains, until you’ve overcome the same obstacle that someone else apparently has not.

However, as Rabbi Mark Wildes once said in a pre-Rosh Hashana talk, a judgment means that the action being judged actually means something; in other words, if one is professing to never be judgmental, one is actually in a certain sense being ipso facto judgmental, by declaring nothing to be important. [Or, to paraphrase Rush [the band, not the EIB], if you choose not to judge, you still have made a judgment]. The question in this case might be: is the judgment call you [or me, or anyone] make in the spirit of “Reuven”, impetuous and not necessarily thought through; “Shimon/Levi”, proactive but sometimes destructive [Shechem may have been justifiable, but the initial idea to kill Yosef was theirs too]; or “Yehuda”, deliberate with the benefit of experience and mistakes? Finally, and ultimately, is one going to be ready to take responsibility for one’s own actions and judgments—even if and especially when they are influential regarding others’?

Friday, December 25, 2009

Vayigash—Making the Call I

Vayigash provides us with the portrayal of two future leaders of the Jewish people operating in two respective emergency situations, but from very different vantage points of power. One uses the seat of power; the other threatens it.

From the top, Yosef oversees the implementation of a rather draconian series of emergency measures to save the Egyptian [and, by extension, the world] economy [see my Vayigash: States of Emergency for a treatment of this].

Yehuda—at least according to the text—approaches Yosef with all the respect due a polity’s second-in command to negotiate for the release of Binyamin. Rashi immediately goes to work to dispel this notion: Yehuda, he says, “spoke to Yosef harshly”, denigrated him as one who “decreed and did not execute”, and threatened to kill both “you [Yosef] and your master”. Yehuda was coming very close to breaking all manner of protocol.

[Theoretically, one might think that Yehuda actually managed to get Yosef for a closed-door session [“yedaber na avdecha davar be-aznei adoni”]; this might be belied by the climactic moment when Yosef finally reveals himself, as the first thing he does is clear the room. Not that it helps: everybody knows by the end of the posuk. Maybe the Pharaonic court had Twitter.]

Either way, we see that the maturation processes of both Yehuda and Yosef—the progenitors of both of our eventual Meshichos—doevtailed almost perfectly at this point in the narrative: Yehuda has finally proven that he wasn’t being impetuous when he lays his olam haba on the line in last week’s parsha to convince Yaakov that the trip to Egypt with Binyamin was necessary, and here he demonstrates his ability to back it up. Yosef—who has already “earned his stripes”, as it were, with his ascent to power paralleling his dreams to that effect—finally recognizes that this point has been reached, preceisely because Yehuda has earned the right to “make the call”.

In next week’s parsha I will show more examples of where certain “calls” made by other shevatim could be overturned on the evidence, and where they couldn’t be but weren’t necessarily the right ones. Just an example from Miketz, however, will provide a hint of sorts: before Yehuda convinces Yaakov to send Binyamin to Egypt with the rest of the brothers, Reuven tries—in a very awkward manner [see 42:37, 38 and Rahi on 38, where he has Yaakov thinking that Reuven’s idea—“my two sons will die”—rendered him a shoteh. More on this to come.]

Friday, December 11, 2009

Vayieshev—Raising or Passing The Bar

Last week I made the point that spiritual “battles” are mostly fought in the dark and I derived from that the advisability of not necessarily “exposing” one’s spiritual roots.

It seems that in this week’s parsha Yaakov Avinu didn’t follow his own advice [and the halachic and midrashic literature is pretty critical of his pedagogical and parental approach] and, because he openly transmitted the Torah he’d learned at Shem and Ever almost exclusively to Yosef—and, both because Yosef had successfully absorbed his learning [and as a motivating tool vis-à-vis his other sons], Yaakov gave Yosef the Kesones Pasim. We all know what resulted.

R’ Shlomo Ressler writes, quoting R’ Yaakov Kaminetsky:

Yaakov loved Yosef more because he learned more, and WANTED the other brothers to be jealous (that's why he made him the shirt), so that they'd want to learn it too!...There's an important lesson in all of this, and that is that jealousy can be used in a good way, as Yaakov TRIED to do. But if we're not careful, we could miss the whole point, and end up doing things we shouldn't.

We’ve already documented the nefarious effects of this educational approach; one might say kol sheken in current settings, where it’s safe to say we’re not dealing with anyone of Biblical stature in our schools. [And, if those of Biblical stature such as the shevatim DID “miss the whole point, and end up doing things [they] shouldn't”, al achas kamah v’kamah….]

There’s another incident at the end of this parsha that also indicate faulty pedagogical approaches. We all know the Rashi on “vayishkachehu” [40:23] that states that Yosef’s counting on the sar hamashkim to put in a good word for his cost him another two years in jail.

It wasn’t until much later in life that I heard that MAYBE that would apply to Yosef because of his spiritual standing [and the obvious miracles that had occurred to him since his kidnapping]. Anyone else who DIDN’T ask for help would be mechazei k’yuhara, at best.

A few years ago I heard an even better explanation, from my mara d’asra, Rabbi Allen Schwartz, who related R’ Shimon Shkop’s explanation that Yosef was punished because he asked TWICE [in 40:14, he first says “zechartani”, and then “ve’hizkartani”]; it was well within his rights to ask the first time.

I’m sure it’s my fault that I wasn’t aware of the first explanation until my 20’s, and the second one until my 30’s. However—if I had heard either one in my formative years I probably would have remembered it. I think there’s a reluctance to proffer either explanation for fear of being viewed as “mi-ketanei amana”.

However, said reluctance is more likely to have the negative effect on pedagogical charges in a similar way to how Yaakov’s approach had on his own family. [And I hope no one tries Yaakov’s approach in the home or beis medrash.]

In a similar vein, there is the notion that it is more important to create gedolim even if it means losing a few of “stragglers” [which is actually stated policy in more than a few mussar seforim], which seems to be at odds with the gemara in Eruvin 54b about R’ Pereida and the lesson requiring a 400-fold repetition. In other words,

You can set the bar too high.

Vayishlach—Roots

In 1992—my junior year in college—I delivered a dvar Torah at a shalosh seudos, the gist of which was such:

The midrashim are all over Yaakov for his diplomatic overtures to his brother at the beginning of the parsha, if not for simply engaging in any diplomacy but not least for deigning to refer to himself as “avdecha Yaakov” [lehavdil, sounds a bit like some of the invective directed at our current President for his public displays of temerity in Suadi Arabia and Japan]. Didn’t Yaakov—who knew kol haTorah kula—know that “Halacha beyadua she’Esav sonei es Yaakov?” What was he thinking?

The midrashim quote from Rashi who explains that Yaakov was covering ALL his bases—“milchama” [as evidenced by “vayitzer lo”—his fear that he might have to kill in self-defense], “tefilah” [“hatzlieni na”] and “doron”, or “presents” [maybe, more accurately, “bribery”—and as shown in 32:16-17, this “mincha” involved a quite a bit of livestock]. The midrashim—some of the same ones who take Yaakov to task for making the overtures in the first place—then quote the gemara in Taanis [20a] that states that one should always be as flexible as a reed rather than rigid as a cedar. Yaakov covered ALL his bases—he didn’t favor one option over the other.

That’s where I left it then [I was referring, obliquely, to the nascent “peace process” at the time and the possibility that some people in our college’s frum community weren’t necessarily holding to the furthest-right political view.]

But there’s another part to the story. The midrashim explain why one should emulate the reed, rather than the cedar: a reed’s roots keep it grounded even as the wind blows it this way and that, while a cedar—no matter how strong—can be toppled by one very strong wind.

I’ll take that a step further: a reed’s roots are sunken—and hidden. A cedar [as many other trees its size and and stature] more often than not will have some of its roots exposed.

It is therefore likely less than accidental that, in between Yaakov’s preparations for and finally meeting Esav, Yaakov is faced with what some consider his signature spiritual moment: his encounter with the “Man”—which occurred at night, in the dark, away from everyone--and someone had to tell him that the struggle was over at first light, and it was Samael, who, while being simultaneously “sar shel Esav”, “Yetzer Hara”, “Satan”, and “Malach HaMaves”—is yet a messenger of G-d.

The first and obvious conclusion is to realize that anyone’s real struggles—spiritual or otherwise—take place “until dawn”, hidden away from everyone and everything.

But, more poignantly, there’s a hint about how “exposing” your “roots” make your approach more vulnerable, or indicate that they may be more tenuous than you think they are. In Yaakov’s case, his flexibility and discretion were almost interchangeable. For most other people, PDA—public displays of almost anything—make everyone uncomfortable. For good reason.

Thursday, November 19, 2009

Toldos—Tired Of Dating?

Conventional wisdom holds that this week’s parsha’s focus is on the family, as evidenced from its very title. I’m going to attempt to turn that notion on its head and try to show that the parsha is trying to tell us something about the nature of communication between the sexes and possibly how the lack thereof before a marriage can cause problems later in the marriage.

In a day and age where a molestation victim killed himself the night after his wedding because he realized he wasn’t anywhere near ready [1], and there is still some “da’as Torah” circles that insist that homosexuality is cured by marriage [R’ J.D. Bleich insisted this must be true because “ein hakadosh baruch hub a be-tiryona im biryosav”], the urgency of “communicating” this seems to have become more pressing.

As an unabashed “modern” and [too] long upper west sider, I basically heard the “da’as Torah” world’s insistence on dating exclusively for tachlis as so: if you let the “system” handle all the potentially messy elements of “dating” [e.g., you don’t go on “real” dates], you’ll avoid the messes inherent in relations between the sexes; you’re practically guaranteed to have the “yud” and the “heh” between the “esh” of “ish” and “ishah”. [R’ Pinchas Stolper’s “The Jewish Way In Love, Dating And Marriage” is one such publication that hews close to this line].

The stories of the avos’ marriages should actually place this notion to bed. Avraham and Sarah’s marital difficulties were legendary, not least due to Hagar/Yishmael and “achosi hi” ; Yaakov’s harem was bound to be problematic [and see my Vayetzei on last year for my take on the wedding night and the Rachel/Leah switch]. However, Yitzchak and Rivkah’s difficulties are more instructive, particularly as, since I pointed out last week, they make up the only monogamous relationship of the three. Rabbi Shlomo Riskin [2] mentions Yitzchak’s conflicted emotions toward his father which was, indirectly at least, a driving force behind the story of how the shidduch with Rivka was executed.

More interestingly, however, was a shiur I heard in 1996 from Avivah Gottlieb Zorenberg about the Rivka seeing Yitzchak for the kaddosh that he was at first sight [and she was so startled that she fell off the camel—see last week, 24:64]. This made her more than occasionally diffident about approaching him directly in communication, as evidenced in this week’s parsha by “le’nochach ishto”, by the fact that she went to Shem for advice—and that she couldn’t tell Yitzchak what she REALLY knew about Esav except by having Yaakov steal the brachos. Even when she did manage to “break the distance” when she had to send Yaakov away, she couldn’t even be candid about the reasons with Yitzchak.

What we see is that anyone who marvels at the “shidduch” system to the point that they portray it a panacea are actually causing more damage than they prevent. [And the special sibling rivalries that resulted.]

Beyond all that and back to my original gripe, it’s as if the worst thing about the “shidduch crisis” is not that people aren’t getting married, it’s that [gasp!] they’ll have to go on “dates”—and they might go on some “real” ones. One might think that, as far as thses people are concerned, all “real” dates end up like Esav coming back from the field tired [according to the medrash, from ravishing a na’arah me’urasa and killing her intended.] One forgets Esav, as midrashim in this parsha relate, was the first “faker” of frumkeit, outwardly portraying a conspicuous religiosity that ostensibly fooled his father, up to the point of his “shidduch” at 40 [Rashi; “My father married at 40…”], when by all rights the ruse should have been uncovered [and was, to a point, but really lasted until after the Yaakov stole the Brachos, when Esav finally dropped the pretense entirely.]

I think what this incident with Esav [the ravish and the murder—sex and death] sums up is, indirectly, what I once said [not here] about the relationship curse of “b-ze’as apecha tochal lechem” [interchanging “lechem” with “pas b’salo”]: it isn’t the “sweat” of work that’s necessarily the curse; it’s the “headache”, the special “ze’as apecha”, that’s the true “pain” of “work”—and the curse is that relationships are going to take work.

No matter what kind—“holy” or otherwise.



1.
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/brooklyn/suicide_groom_twist_pa15C1Z5nGPyHIYj18xCNI

2.
http://www.ohrtorahstone.org.il/parsha/5770/vayera70.htm

Thursday, November 12, 2009

Chayei Sarah—Family Values?

In Vezos Habracha I raised the possibility that the Torah set the “family” values priority lower than one might think. I didn’t visit the issue in as much detail there, nor in the first few parshiyos of Bereishis, where—as I mentioned three weeks ago—the Torah deals mostly with the “world at large”.

My Mother sent me an email a few years ago headed “Would Yeshivish People Date Anyone From The Torah?” [I’ve included the detailed text at the end of this bit.] But even taking a more serious angle the families are hardly nuclear and certainly dysfunctional:

*Avraham’s [and, later, Yitzchak’s] “sister” line when faced with a monarch casting eyes on their spouse [a theme that will repeat itself later, in a different form, re David and Batsheva];

*Avraham’s taking of a concubine at Sarah’s insistence, then chasing her out [and causing her to miscarry], taking her back in, then chasing her out again….

*…when, among other things, a teenage Yishmael either tries to kill and/or molest his half-brother Yitzchak [“metzachek” has a dual connotation], resulting in his [and his mother’s] SECOND exile from the Abrahamic household;

*and, to close out the first leg of the cycle, the strong link between the death of Sarah following [if not as a direct result of] the Akeda, and the story of how Avraham and Eliezer arrange the shidduch between Yitchak and Rivkah.

[In another link to the theme of “Its Good Ta Be Da King” above re Pharaoh and the Avimelechs, Besuel himself was an ardent practitioner of the droit de signeur, or the right of the local magistrate to ritually deflower a virgin before her wedding night [“Besuel” can be not necessarily loosely translated as “Lord of the Virgins”], and the midrash relates that Besuel was under pressure to administer said defloration to his own daughter by the locals who were rather perturbed at the possibility that she might be exempted. Apparently, one of the reasons for his Divinely-executed sudden death during the night [Rashi on 24:55] was that he was more inclined to actually assert his privileges.]

I mentioned in Noach re the incident between Noach, Cham and Cannan how the Torah seems to make an inexorable connection between same-sex relations and violence. In an only slightly more subtle sense, this whole series of events may show the Torah’s rather dim view of the exercise of power in sex [Rashi on 24:57, s.v. “nish’ala es pihah, where we learn the halacha of “ein masi’in isha elah mida’ata”.] I would take this a step further: while the Torah is likely inevitably patriarchal, it does not necessarily view this as a good thing [see my Vayetzei from last year, and http://jewishbible.blogspot.com/2005/10/ten-curses-of-eve-unpublishable.html].

In what might seem to be a tangential point, I would actually use the Torah’s discomfort with the admixture of sex and power as one of the reasons that it insists so strongly upon matrilineal descent. While almost all other familial halachos are patrilineally determined, the Torah does not want the establishment of its “family” to be based upon a simple equation of evolutionary biology and raw tribalism. When you contrast between the fact of the machinations behind the shidduch and the fact that Yitzchak and Rivkah made the only monogamous marriage among the Avos, this parsha may actually serve as a stronger support for this notion than one might think.


And now, the email I promised:

Would Yeshivish People Date Anyone From The Torah?

There's Avraham Avinu: He seems to be frum but really he's a BT and his father made idols, not our kind...next.

Yitzchak Avinu: Well his grandfather made idols, there was all that nastiness with Lot and is half brother in an arab.

Yaakov Avinu: His great-grandfather made idols, his brother went off the derech, his mother comes from a very treyfe family and he wasn't shomer negiah with Rachel Imeinu before they were married and he spent a lot of time with his uncle, who's mammesh a rasha.

Yosef HaTzaddik: His mother had an idol once and she died early, plus he's a slave and his brothers don't like him, must be something in that and with all the issues with Avraham Avinu and Yitzchak and Yaakov Avinu...better not to.

Moshe Rabbeinu: Oy, what a maaseh!!!! His parents separated, then they got back together, his parents abandoned him, put him in a basket, he was raised by goyim...not our kind for sure. He may be close to Hashem but his background is so problematic we wouldn't want him in our family!

Caleb's descendants: We don't want to marry into that family. Enough said.

David HaMelech: Descendants from a Geyoret, not our kind of people. Sure a few generations have gone by but all things being equal shouldn't we look for someone with mor e 'jewish' background.

Shlomo HaMelech: See above, all his mother's marriage was very dubious, he is rich though but the yichus and family background is very tricky
.

Thursday, November 5, 2009

Vayera—A Proposed Akeda

The Akeda is symbolic of two ostensibly contradictory impulses in Judaism.

The first is how it is supposed to embody the strength of our relationship with G-d as exemplified by our willingness to sacrifice everything for Him. So much so that we recite the passage daily and implore G-d to “squelch His anger the way Avraham squelched his mercy” [which somewhat amplifies its self-contradictory nature].

The second impulse is Yirmiyahu 19:5 quoted in Taanis 4a, where the Akeda, Yiftach’s sacrifice of his daughter, and Mesha Melech Moav’s sacrifice of his son to Moloch are all referred to as what G-d had “neither commanded, nor spoke of, nor did it ever enter My mind.” Many an analogy has been made with current Islamist practice of suicide bombing as the modern-day equivalent of Moloch worship.

I originally was all set to use this notion as a jumping-off point to the recent tragedy at Fort Hood and the continuing reluctance of most media outlets to refer to the religion of the perpetrator. I’ve always said, at times, we have to thank G-d for the fundamentalist strains in other religions; they make us look good.

Then I came across this recent story:“A rabbinical court imprisoned a man because of violence and his refusal to grant a divorce. Yet the court differentiated between "regular beatings" which does not merit a hiyuv get [a rabbinical mandate to force the man to grant a divorce], and beatings that can kill, which does in fact merit a hiyuv get (see haDin ve-haDayan 4[3]). In the opinion of the rabbinical court, it seems that "regular" beatings are something that a woman is capable of living with, and in any event, divorce should not be imposed because of it. An act that constitutes a criminal offense in the State of Israel does not constitute grounds for divorce in the rabbinical court. “

Their justification?

“…in this new reality, in which [the civil courts] want to bind the hands of the rabbinical courts so that they will be unable to continue to rule on agreements that they ratified [the woman's appeal to the Supreme Court], and in which civil courts enjoy easily nullifying decisions of the rabbinical courts, this situation has the potential to cause serious harm...".

Apparently, “extra-halachic” considerations motivated the bes din to impose their own “akeda” upon the woman/women suffering in these marriages. Better to take one for the team even if it leads to the halachic sanction of wife-beating [which this is].

I propose we conduct an akeda of our own. 

I would go as far as finding out:

  • who their own poskim and rabbinic mentors are;
  • where they learned in Yeshiva;
  • where they teach and who is responsible for hiring them;
  • whether they have published sefarim and/or shailos/tshuvos, and who publishes them;
  • if any of them are marei d’asra or serve in any shul leadership capacity, have this tshuva posted in their shuls and neighborhoods so that their kehillos know that they condone wife beating. [Let them deny it.]


I wouldn’t limit it to the above; I might actually have a criminal investigation opened up, alleging that domestic violence is being condoned [if not advocated].

There’s a story which may or may not be an Orthodox urban legend about a group of women who, upon hearing that a certain individual in their community was withholding a get, took it upon themselves to not go to mikvah until the get was granted. That may have been the best modern day example of halachic civil disobedience.

This is different.  It is not a case of a “theoretical” halachic decision, or a rabbi musing about a world that is not sympathetic to halachic concerns.  These people need to be “sacrificed” for the impression of Torah they give, as the kind of people who lead to our being equated with the reactionary elements in other religions. And, in light of their justifications of their psak, it’s mida kneged mida.